

Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology

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In this work, I argue for a conception of color that is alternative to both subjectivism and objectivism. I call it *color relationism* (distinguishing it from color *relationalism*), and I develop it by drawing on both enactivism and genetic phenomenology. Specifically, I define the concept of *dependent coarising*, which is at the base of the enactive view, within the framework of transcendental philosophy, defining in this way a transcendental version of enactivism. Then, I find a foundation for this view in the genetic deepening of transcendental phenomenology and, in particular, in its analysis of the relation between sensations and sensible properties (*genetic co-constitution*). Finally, I conceive of the comparative argument, which is at the heart of the enactive view of color, within the framework of genetic phenomenology, claiming that it leads to affirm the transcendental status of the living and lived body.
