

## **Knowingly Illusory Presence**

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There are many forms in which pictorial perception is a *sui generis* form of perception, as Wollheim (1980, 1987, 1998) maintained in his claim that such a perception is *twofold*, by being simultaneously directed both to the picture's *vehicle*, the physical basis of the picture, and to the picture's *subject*, what the picture displays, in its configurational fold and in its recognitional fold respectively. One of such forms consists in the fact that, unlike standard perceptual experiences of it, the picture's subject is present as absent (Noë 2012). One may cash out in different ways what this distinctive form of presence amounts to: *artificial* presence (Wiesing 2010), presence of a *universal* (Aasen 2016), *virtual* presence (Briscoe 2017). However, all such ways are ultimately unsatisfactory. I will rather claim that in that perception, the subject is *knowingly illusorily* present. This means not only that, unlike imaginative experiences, the subject's presence is represented in the *content* of pictorial perception, notably in the content of its recognitional fold, but also that, unlike standard perceptual experiences, the subject's presence is not given in the *mode* of such a perception: the subject is not *felt* as present. For not only one knows that such a subject is not there (hence, its presence is illusory) but also one has such a knowledge in virtue of the fact that another item is given as present in such a perception (or better, in its configurational fold, namely, the picture's vehicle (Voltolini 2015, Ferretti 2016). However, this situation does not prevent a picture, or better the picture's vehicle, from displaying its subject, hence to present it. This depends on the fact that the relationship between the most relevant properties that the picture's vehicle exemplifies, its design properties (Lopes 2005), is the same as the manifestational relationship that holds, in a standard perceptual experience, between the properties of the experience and the perceptual properties of the object of that experience.

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