POLITICAL ACTION AND DISCURSIVE NORMS

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Abstract: Just a few days ago, at the closing of Cannes Film Festival, director and actress Asia Argento made a powerful speech. Among several other things, her speech contained the assertion that she was raped by Harvey Weinstein. Was that a political action? The capacity to perform a political action often requires the capacity to do certain things with words. This latter capacity is constrained by the position the subject occupies in the social structure. Not everyone can do the same with their words. Different positions afford different ranges of speech acts. Unjust limitations of a subject’s capacity to do things with their words are cases of discursive injustice (Kukla 2014). Here I would like to explore how political agency, or the capacity to perform and take part in political actions, tracks discursive capacity. If the analysis is on track, it will allow us to see some failures of political agency as the result of discursive injustice.