

## **Twofold Pictorial Experience, Propositional Imagining and Recognitional Concepts: a Critique of Walton's Visual Make-Believe**

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Kendall Walton has defined pictorial experience appealing to the notion of *visual make-believe*, whose aim is to account for our distinctive *twofold* simultaneous awareness of the physical image and what it depicts, while staring at a picture. A visual game of make believe is a practice of imagining *about* our actual seeing the material representational prop that it is a face to face fictional seeing the represented subject. Some brief remarks of Walton himself have suggested to understand the imaginative state involved in this complex experience as having a *propositional* content. In this paper, I will argue that a so developed visual make-believe theory is not able to capture both the central intuitions about the twofold and the visual character of our acquaintance with images. The first reason is that if our imagining is supposed to alter the value of our perception of the prop by deploying relevant recognitional concepts, the propositional fictional content is made available to us as a *prior* and *independent* condition of visually recognizing the image itself. The second point is that even if we take the conceptual recognition of the scene depicted to be an integrated part of our visual perception of the prop, we lose the sharp distinction within our twofold awareness of both the material features and the subject of the image. Given that twofoldness is an hardly deniable character of pictorial experience, failing to deal with it is a crucial problem for the notion of visual make-believe.

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