Abstract: Our argument starts from the assumption that vulnerability stems from a condition of deprivation, whatever the causes of it, and regardless of eventual direct, indirect, or absence of, responsibility of vulnerable subjects.

The focus of our paper is the condition of climate migrants, whom we recognize as vulnerable subjects. We aim specifically to investigate two points: A) if the concept of responsibility is of any use in the context of migrations, and B) if it is appropriate in the case of climate migrants.

Regarding A), we are going to investigate to what extent holding migrants themselves responsible for, among other things, voting for a corrupt government, or taking a series of wrong life-choices, affects their claims to hospitality in a foreign country; or whether the causal responsibility of host countries in, for instance, contributing to wars or to political instability in migrants’ homeland, can be said to determine a specific duty to accept migrants.

Regarding B), we will investigate if the two concepts of responsibility (of peoples or of countries) are applicable in the case of climate migrants. We will focus on the concept of innocent victims in order to understand whether it has any connection to the status of vulnerability. We will propose, eventually, that the only appropriate remedy to vulnerability cannot be based on benevolence, but rather on considerations of justice.